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Abstract: The internet-of-things (also known as IoT) connects a large number of information-sensing
devices to the Internet to collect all kinds of information needed in real time. The reliability of
the source of a large number of accessed information tests the processing speed of signatures.
Batch signature allows a signer to sign a group of messages at one time, and signatures’ verification
can be completed individually and independently. Therefore, batch signature is suitable for data
integration authentication in IoT. An outstanding advantage of batch signature is that a signer is able
to sign as many messages as possible at one time without worrying about the size of signed messages.
To reduce complexity yielded by multiple message signing, a binary tree is usually leveraged in the
construction of batch signature. However, this structure requires a batch residue, making the size of
a batch signature (for a group of messages) even longer than the sum of single signatures. In this
paper, we make use of the intersection method from lattice to propose a novel generic method for
batch signature. We further combine our method with hash-and-sign paradigm and Fiat–Shamir
transformation to propose new batch signature schemes. In our constructions, a batch signature
does not need a batch residue, so that the size of the signature is relatively smaller. Our schemes are
securely proved to be existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks under the
small integer solution problem, which shows great potential resisting quantum computer attacks.
Keywords: IoT; message integration authentication; batch signature; tree structure;
intersection method; lattice
1. Introduction
IoT connects all kinds of objects with the Internet, through various sensing technologies
and various means of communication, to achieve remote monitoring and other purposes [1–4].
Because of large numbers of nodes, wide sources of information and fast updating of information,
information authentication processing is very stressful, which brings forward a new research topic for
digital signature.
Digital signature was firstly defined and designed in [5–7]. This security mechanism allows
a message owner to put digital "stamp" on a message to declare the corresponding ownership.
Since its introduction, digital signature has been widely employed in many real-world applications,
e.g., authentication [8], message integrity check [9], electronic voting, electronic property ownership
proof (cryptocurrencies—https://bitcoin.org/en/) and other cloud-based applications [10–12]. Due to
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various of construction techniques, there are many variants of digital signature systems by far,
e.g., El-Gamal [13], RSA-based [7], DSA and ECDSA. When it comes to the environment of IoT,
batch signature, which is a variant of conventional digital signature, is a good choice.
1.1. Batch Signature
The notion of batch signature was firstly proposed by Fiat [14] in CRYPTO 1989. It allows a
valid user to sign many messages with almost the cost of one signature operation. In other words,
batch signature scheme could sign multiple messages simultaneously. Like carbon paper, someone only
needs to sign the top file once by inserting each file in the middle of the carbon paper, all the documents
are signed, and each message can be independently verified by recipients. This cryptographic primitive
has greatly improved the efficiency of signing a large number of messages.
Following Fiat’s seminal work, a lot of works on batch signature have been proposed. In 1996,
M’Raïhi and Naccache [15] gave a batch exponentiation strategy, and applied it to the batch generation
of fixed-g-based signatures. In 1999, Pavlovski and Boyd [16] presented a batch signature scheme
based on binary tree structure. Binary tree structure is a general construction to transform a common
signature algorithm into a batch signature algorithm. In addition, Cheng et al. [17] and Korkmaz [18]
analysed the efficiency of existed batch signatures independently.
Besides theoretical construction, there are many more scenarios to apply batch signature
technology. In 1999, Boyd et al. [19] proposed an efficient electronic cash using batch signatures.
In 2008, Youn et al. [20] applied batch signature in imbalanced communication. We find batch signature
is also indispensable in IoT and blockchain. In IoT, when messages from multiple sensor nodes are
imported into the host, batch signature of messages is a good way to improve the efficiency of signature.
In blockchain, multiple transactions could be handled simultaneously in one-block-generated time.
We may save time and space cost by using batch signature scheme.
Faced with a large number of application requirements, the theoretical research of batch signature
is not perfect. There are some defects about the existed batch signature, for example, the limited
number of signed messages, dependence of signature verification on batch residue and the risk of
anti-quantum algorithm attack.
1.2. Lattice-Based Signature
The above constructions are based on the traditional number theory assumptions. According to
Shor’s results [21], they can not resist the quantum computer’s attack. In the aspect of anti-quantum,
lattice-based cryptography is a hot spot for cryptologists, due to the following three advantages.
Firstly, large integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems have been proven to be unable
to resist quantum computer’s attacks, meanwhile, there is no quantum algorithm that could solve
hard problems in lattice. Secondly, cryptographic schemes based on the difficulty assumptions of the
average case lattice problems can be reduced to the difficulty assumptions of the worst case lattice
problems. It means that the security of cryptographic schemes built on average case lattice problems
depends on the worst case lattice problems. The majority of public key cryptosystems are lack of
this feature. Thirdly, most of the operations in the lattice are linear operations, so that lattice-based
cryptographic schemes have potential computational efficiency.
Lattice-based cryptography has achieved many results. Ajtai [22] proposed the small integer
solution problem, known as the SIS problem, in 1996. It is an average case problem hard to solve for
appropriate parameter settings, and its difficulty is based on worst case lattice hard problems. The SIS
problem, as well as its extension, the inhomogeneous small integer solution problem ISIS, forms the
foundation of lattice-based signature schemes.
The most important theoretical breakthrough of lattice-based signature began with the signature
scheme in [23]. The main structure of this signature scheme includes a trapdoor generation algorithm
and preimage sampleable algorithm; these two algorithms are both with relatively large computational
complexity, which hinders the practicability of signature schemes.
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In order to solve the efficiency problem of signature schemes, cryptologists have considered
the issue from many different perspectives. Alwen and Peikert [24] showed the techniques to
get better trapdoor at a faster speed. Micciancio and Peikert [25] proposed a different structure,
converted the general lattice trapdoor generation algorithm into a simple lattice trapdoor generation
algorithm, and designed a more efficient trapdoor generation algorithm. As a by-product of this new
algorithm, the efficiency of preimage sampleable algorithm has also been greatly improved. Therefore,
the signature scheme in [25] has better efficiency and security.
Signature schemes in [23,25] have the same construction idea and both belong to the hash-and-sign
paradigm. In 2012, Lyubashevsky [26] followed the Fiat–Shamir transformation, managed to avoid
the use of trapdoor generation algorithm and preimage sampleable algorithm, and constructed
more efficient signature schemes using matrix-vector multiplications and rejecting samplings.
These signature schemes make the lattice-based signature schemes practical. Since then, lattice-based
signature has continued with more and more contributions, but the core idea still follows the above
mentioned signature schemes from [23,25,26].
1.3. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose lattice-based batch signature schemes. Our batch signature schemes
remove the batch residue in [19], which makes our batch signature has the same length as one
ordinary signature.
1. We propose lattice-based batch signature schemes for the first time. Our schemes possess a
general property, that is, our construction can be combined with any existing lattice-based
signature scheme.
2. The technique we use is an extension of the intersection method from [27]. The intersection
method is as follows: for n−dimensional integer lattices Λ1 and Λ2 such that Λ1 +Λ2 = Zn and
Λ1
⋂
Λ2 6= φ, there exists a short vector e, which belongs to v1 +Λ1 ∩ v2 +Λ2 and can be viewed
as a signature of v1 ∈ Zn and v2 ∈ Zn.
We demonstrate this technique with a concrete example in terms of k ≥ 2. In detail, let Λ1 = p1Zn,
Λ2 = p2Zn, · · · ,Λk = pkZn with k primes p1, p2, · · · , pk. Because p1, p2, · · · , pk are different
primes, p1Zn + p2Zn + · · · + pkZn = Zn and p1Zn ∩ p2Zn ∩ · · · ∩ pkZn = p1 p2 · · · pkZn 6= φ.
Therefore, for k messages v1, v2, · · · , vk ∈ Zn, there exists a short vector e ∈ v1 + p1Zn ∩ v2 +
p2Zn ∩ · · · ∩ vk + pkZn, which binds v1, v2, · · · , vk and can be viewed as their batch signature.
3. With the intersection method as core technique, we give two batch signature schemes based
on hash-and-sign paradigm and Fiat–Shamir transformation, as well as a lattice-based batch
signature scheme based on binary tree.
1.4. Organization
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we give some basic definitions and facts about
lattice-based cryptography in Section 2. Then, we describe batch signature scheme definition and
security in Section 3. In Section 4, we give lattice-based batch signature scheme based on binary tree.
In Section 5, we propose lattice-based batch signature scheme based on hash-and-sign paradigm and
the intersection method. In Section 6, we demonstrate lattice-based batch signature scheme based on
Fiat–Shamir transformation and the intersection method. In Section 7, we present the comparison of
our schemes with other lattice-based batch signatures, then describe batch signature’s application to
IoT. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. Preliminaries
We make use of standard asymptotic notations in our paper. For any function f (n) and g(n)
with positive real value set R as range, f = O(g) means that there are constants a and b such that
f (n) ≤ ag(n) for all n ≥ b; f = o(g) if and only if limn→∞ f (n)/g(n) = 0; f = ω(g) if and only
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if g = o( f ); f (n) is negligible if and only if f = o(1/g) for any polynomial g(n) = nc; f (n) is
overwhelming if and only if 1− f (n) is negligible.
Definition 1. DZm ,s,c is the discrete Gaussian distribution in Zm, its center is c and Gaussian parameter
is s. If the center is vector 0, 0 may be omitted. If e ←− DZm ,s, its Euclidean norm is ‖e‖ ≤ s
√
m with
overwhelming probability [23].
Definition 2. Trapdoor generation algorithm TrapGen(n, q, m) inputs n, q and m, where n is an integer, q ≥ 3
is an odd, and m = d6n log qe is the minimum integer not less than 6n log q. The algorithm outputs a pair
(A ∈ Zn×mq , T ∈ Zm×m) such that A is statistically close to a uniform random matrix in Zn×mq , T is a basis for
Λ⊥q (A) satisfying ‖T˜‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q) and ‖T‖ ≤ O(n log q) with overwhelming probability. Here, T˜ is the
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization matrix of T, ‖T‖ denotes the largest Euclidean norm of the column vectors in
matrix T [24].
Definition 3. Let A ∈ Zn×mq , T is a basis for Λ⊥q (A), and s ≥ ‖T˜‖ · ω(
√
log m). Then for u ∈ Znq ,
preimage sampleable algorithm SamplePre(A, T, u, s) samples x satisfying ‖x‖≤ s√m and Ax = u mod
q [23].
Definition 4. Small integer solution (SIS) [23]
SIS problem is defined as: for integer q, real β and matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , search an integer vector e ∈ Zm
satisfying Ae = 0 mod q, ‖e‖ ≤ β and e 6= 0.
Definition 5. The intersection of lattice Λ1 and lattice Λ2 is not empty, and Λ1 +Λ2 = Zn for element wise
addition. v1, v2 ∈ Zn are the coset representatives of Λ1 and Λ2, respectively. Then there exists a vector e ∈ Zn
such that e = v1 mod Λ1 and e = v2 mod Λ2. This result can be generalized to multiple lattices [27].
Definition 6. Target Collision Resistant (TCR) Hash function [28]
Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a collision-resistant hash function if it satisfies the following properties:
• (length-compressing): m < n
• (hard to find collisions): For all PPT A, there exists a negligible function e such that for all security
parameters n ∈ N,
Pr[(x0, x1)← A(1n, h) : x0 6= x1 ∩ h(x0) = h(x1)] 6 e(n)
3. System Definition and Threat Model
In this section, we give batch signature definitions of generic algorithms and security, which divide
into two parts.
3.1. Definition of Batch Signature System
Batch signature can use a signing action to complete the signing of a number of different messages,
and the verification of individual message is independent. Besides, the system setup algorithm and
key generation algorithm in batch signature scheme are as same as that of ordinary signature scheme.
• Setup(λ): Inputting security parameter λ, this algorithm determines necessary system public
parameters PP.
• KeyGen(λ): With security parameter λ and system parameters PP as above, this algorithm
provides public verification key vk and secret signing key sk.
• Sign(sk, {v1, · · · ,vk}): Given signing key sk and messages set {v1, · · · ,vk}, this algorithm
computes batch signature e.
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• Verify(vk,vj, e, j = 1, · · · , k): Given message vj and its signature e associated with verification
key vk, this algorithm tells whether the j-th message has gained valid authentication, and outputs
1 if the answer is yes, otherwise outputs 0.
3.2. Threat Model
Batch signature scheme should also satisfy existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen
message attacks (EUF-CMA). We introduce a challenger C and an adversary A interacting with each
other in the next game, to describe batch signature scheme’s security.
• Initialization: In this period, challenger C executes algorithms Setup and KeyGen,
provides system public parameters PP and public verification key vk for adversary A.
• Signing queries: In this stage, adversary A selects a set of messages (v1,v2, · · · ,vk), sends the
messages’ set to challenger C for the associated signature. Challenger C invokes Sign algorithm,
returns the result to adversary A. Adversary A may repeat the query polynomial times in his
favorite manner.
• Forgery: Once adversary A terminates signing queries, he offers a new message-signature pair
(v∗1 ,v
∗
2 , · · · ,v∗k , e).
If message-signature pair (v∗1 ,v
∗
2 , · · · ,v∗k , e) is valid and has not been queried, adversary A wins
the game.
Theorem 1. Batch signature scheme is existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message
attacks(EUF-CMA), if for all adversary A with polynomial bounded computational power, the probability
of he wins above game is negligible.
4. Lattice-Based Batch Signature with Binary Tree
4.1. Proposed Construction
In this part, we combine the signature scheme in [23] and the structure of binary tree in [19],
propose the first lattice-based batch signature scheme. The scheme includes the following steps,
and the Figure 1 shows the binary tree for message processing.
H1
(0)
=H0(੧0) H0(੧1)
H0(੧2)
H0(੧3)
H0(੧4)
H0(੧5)
H1
(1)
H1
(2)
H1
(3)
H1
(4)
H1
(5)
Figure 1. The Schematic of the Binary Tree.
• Setup(λ): In this stage, system parameters are provided with knowledge of security parameter λ.
1. n is a polynomial of λ, q ≥ 3 is a polynomial of n, m = d6n log qe, t = O(√n log q).
2. k is the number of messages to batch sign, and s ≥ t ·ω(√log m) is the Gaussian parameter.
3. H0 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Znq and H1 : Z2nq −→ Znq are two collision resistant hash functions.
• KeyGen(λ): With system parameters as above, public verification key vk and secret signing key sk
are obtained as follows. Invoke trapdoor generation algorithm TrapGen(n, q, m) to get a uniform
and random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and the short basis T ∈ Zm×m for lattice Λ⊥q (A) with ‖T˜‖ ≤ t.
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Finally output vk = A, sk = T.
• Sign(sk, {v0, · · · ,vk−1} ∈ {{0, 1}∗}k): Given sk = T and the set of messages {v0, · · · ,vk−1} ∈
{{0, 1}∗}k, the following steps lead to batch signature on such messages.
1. Compute H0(v0), H0(v1),· · · , H0(vk−1), let H(0)1 = H0(v0), and execute for-loop as follows.
for i = 1 to k− 1:
H(i)1 = H1(H
(i−1)
1 ‖H0(vi))
i = i + 1
2. Compute e =SamplePre(A, T, H(k−1)1 , s).
3. For vi, i = 0, · · · , k− 1, compute its brother Bi. Firstly, B0 = (H0(v1),R), the left are shown
in the next for-loop.
for i = 1 to k− 1:
Bi = (H
(i−1)
1 ,L)
i = i + 1
Here, for vi’s brother Bi, its first entry denotes vi’s brother note, its second entry denotes the
brother locates on vi’s left(L) or right(R).
4. For vi, i = 0, · · · , k− 1, compute its residue Ri. At first,
R0 = {(H0(v1),R), (H0(v2),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)}
= {B0, (H0(v2),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)},
the left are shown in the next for-loop.
for i = 1 to k− 2:
Ri = {(H(i−1)1 ,L), (H0(vi+1),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)}
= {Bi, (H0(vi+1,R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)}
i = i + 1
When i = k− 1, Ri = Bk−1 = {(H(k−2)1 ,L)}.
Here, vi’s residue Ri includes vi’s brother Bi and all of its ancestor nodes’s brothers.
5. For vi, i = 0, · · · , k− 1, its signature is (e, Ri).
• Verify(vk,vj, (e, Rj), j = 0, · · · , k− 1): Given message vj and its signature (e, Rj) associated with
verification key vk = A,
1. H(k−1)1 should be recovered firstly.
(1) If j = 0,
R0 = {(H0(v1),R), (H0(v2),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)}
= {B0, (H0(v2),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)},
for i = 1 to k− 1:
H(i)1 = H1(H
(i−1)
1 ‖H0(vi))
i = i + 1
When for-loop terminates, H(k−1)1 is obtained.
(2) If j 6= 0,
Rj = {(H(j−1)1 ,L), (H0(vj+1),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)}
= {Bj, (H0(vj+1),R), · · · , (H0(vk−1),R)},
for i = j to k− 1:
H(i)1 = H1(H
(i−1)
1 ‖H0(vi))
i = i + 1
When for-loop terminates, H(k−1)1 is obtained.
2. Check whether ‖e‖ ≤ s√m and Ae = H(k−1)1 mod q. If both relations are true, return
1 and accept the message-signature pair (vj, (e, Rj)); otherwise, return 0 and reject the
message-signature pair.
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4.2. Security Analysis
Correctness of the scheme comes from the preimage sampleable algorithm. According to
Definition 3, for messages set {v1,v2, · · · ,vk}, assume the root of the binary tree is H(k−1)1 , due to
e = SamplePre(A, T, H(k−1)1 , s), ‖e‖ ≤ s
√
m and Ae = H(k−1)1 mod q hold. Moreover, without secret
signing key T, no one can call preimage sampleable algorithm to get a vector e that meets the
verification criteria. Therefore, there is no problem with the correctness of the scheme.
Security of the scheme comes from the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If SIS problem is hard to solve, the lattice-based batch signature scheme based on binary tree has
existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA).
Proof. We assume that adversary A has breached the signature scheme, taking advantage of this
attack power, challenger C can solve SIS problem for matrix A ∈ Zn×mq . Because SIS problem is a hard
problem, we ca not find the answer to SIS instance A, which conflicts with our result. In this way,
we get that no such adversary exists, and our scheme is secure.
• Initialization: In this period, challenger C executes setup algorithm to set system parameters,
he sets public verification key vk = A, sends all of them to adversary A.
• Hash queries: Challenger C creates a list to save the binary tree for k messages, and sets
H = {((v0, · · · ,vk−1), (H0(v0), · · · , H0(vk−1)), (H(1)1 , · · · , H(k−1)1 ), e)}.
When adversary A sends a set of messages (v0, · · · ,vk−1) to challenger C for hash values.
C searches listH,
If (v0, · · · ,vk−1) do not exist in list H, C chooses e ←− DZm,s, sets H(k−1)1 = Ae mod q. Then C
randomly picks H0(vi), i = 0, · · · , k− 1, sets H(i)1 = H1(H(i−1)1 ‖H0(vi)) for i = 1 to k− 1, here H(0)1 =
H0(v0). C saves ((v0, · · · ,vk−1), (H0(v0), · · · , H0(vk−1)), (H(1)1 , · · · , H(k−1)1 ), e) in the listH.
If (v0, · · · ,vk−1) exist in listH, C does nothing.
At last, C returns ((H0(v0), · · · , H0(vk−1)), (H(1)1 , · · · , H(k−1)1 )) to adversary A.
• Signature queries: In this stage, adversary A selects a set of messages (v0, · · · ,vk−1), sends the
messages’ set to challenger C for the associated signature. Challenger C firstly searches list H
for the messages’ set. If it exists, C returns ((H0(v0), · · · , H0(vk−1)), (H(1)1 , · · · , H(k−1)1 ), e) to
adversary A. If the messages’ set does not exist, C executes hash query firstly. Adversary Amay
repeat the query polynomial times in his favorite manner.
• Forgery: Once adversary A terminates signing queries, he forges a valid message-signature pair
((v∗0 , · · · ,v∗k−1), (H0(v∗0 ), · · · , H0(v∗k−1)), (H(1)1∗ , · · · , H(k−1)1∗ ), e∗).
C searches ((v∗0 , · · · ,v∗k−1), (H0(v∗0 ), · · · , H0(v∗k−1)), (H(1)1∗ , · · · , H(k−1)1∗ ), e′) in list H,
then computes e′ − e∗ as the solution to the SIS instance A, and the analysis is as following.
Due to the validity of the message-signature pair, adversary A has not made signing query
on (v∗0 , · · · ,v∗k−1), and hash query on (v∗0 , · · · ,v∗k−1) has been done. Given H(k−1)1∗ , according to
preimage min-entropy property of hash function [23], the min-entropy of e∗ is ω(log n), so that
e′ − e∗ 6= 0 with overwhelming probability. Because e′ ←− DZm ,s, ‖e′‖ ≤ s
√
m. ‖e∗‖ ≤ s√m depends
on the validity of forged signature. Therefore, ‖e′ − e∗‖ ≤ 2s√m.
5. Lattice-Based Batch Signature Based on Hash-and-Sign Paradigm
Lattice-based batch signature scheme based on binary tree is successfully constructed and
proved, but the signature should associate with all other messages in the batch to complete signature
verification, and batch signature length is, thus, longer. Inspired by [27,29], we make use of an
intersection method to accomplish the second and third lattice-based batch signature schemes.
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These two schemes’ signature verification does not require involvement of other messages, so that the
length of the signature is shorter, and their schematic of algorithms is shown in the Figure 2.
H(੧1) 
V=H(੧1) modȿ1
H(੧2) 
V=H(੧2) modȿ2
H(੧k) 
V=H(੧k) modȿk
ĊĊĊĊ
Intersection 
method
V
Signature of V
Intersection 
method
V modȿ1=H(੧1) V modȿ2=H(੧2) V modȿk=H(੧k) ĊĊĊĊ
Verification Verification Verification
Figure 2. The Schematic of the Intersection Method.
5.1. Design
Here is our second lattice-based batch signature scheme, which follows the hash-and-sign
paradigm and the core technique is the intersection method.
• Setup(λ): In this stage, system parameters are provided with knowledge of security parameter λ.
1. n is a polynomial of λ, q ≥ 3 is a polynomial of n, m = d6n log qe, l = O(√n log q).
2. k is the number of messages to batch sign, and s ≥ l ·ω(√log m) is the Gaussian parameter.
3. H : {0, 1}∗ −→ Zn is a collision resistant hash function.
• KeyGen(λ): With system parameters as above, public verification key vk and secret signing key
sk are obtained in the following manners.
1. Invoke trapdoor generation algorithm TrapGen(n, q, m) to get a uniform and random matrix
A ∈ Zn×mq , and the short basis T ∈ Zm×m for lattice Λ⊥q (A) with ‖T˜‖ ≤ l.
2. Compute k different lattices Λi, i = 1, · · · , k, such that Λ1 + Λ2 + · · · + Λk = Zn and
Λ1 ∩Λ2 ∩ · · · ∩Λk = Λ, which takes q as modulus.
Then vk = (A,Λ,Λi, i = 1, · · · , k), sk = T.
• Sign(sk, {v1, · · · ,vk} ∈ {{0, 1}∗}k): Given sk = T and the set of messages {v1, · · · ,vk} ∈
{{0, 1}∗}k, the following steps lead to batch signature on such messages.
1. Construct equations: 
v = H(v1)modΛ1
v = H(v2)modΛ2
· · ·
v = H(vk)modΛk
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compute its solution v.
2. Invoke preimage sampleable algorithm SamplePre(A, T, v, s) to get the signature e.
• Verify(vk,vj, e): For the j-th message vj and the signature e, validation involves the following
two relations:
1. ‖e‖ ≤ s√m.
2. Ae = H(vj)modΛj.
If they are both true, accept message vj; otherwise, reject it.
5.2. Security Analysis
Correctness of the second scheme is similar to that of the first scheme. By Definition 3,
‖e‖ ≤ s√m and Ae = v mod q. By Definition 2, v = H(vj) mod Λj. Combining Ae = v mod q
and v = H(vj) mod Λj, Ae = H(vj) mod Λj. Moreover, without signing key T, nobody can invoke
preimage sampleable algorithm to get a vector e satisfying the verification relations.
Security of the scheme comes from the following Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. If SIS problem is a hard problem, the lattice-based batch signature scheme based on hash-and-sign
paradigm has existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA).
Proof. If there exists an adversary A who has the ability to forge batch signature for some messages,
there exists a challenger C has the ability to give the solution to SIS instance A ∈ Zn×mq , here the
challenger C will seek the help of the adversary A. Since SIS problem is a hard problem, the solution
to SIS instance A is hard to obtained, this is in contradiction with our result. Therefore, the adversary
A who has the ability to forge batch signature does not exist, and our lattice-based batch signature
scheme based on hash-and-sign paradigm has EUF-CMA security.
• Initialization: In this period, challenger C sets appropriate system parameters, lets public
verification key vk = A, sends all of them to adversary A.
• Hash queries: Challenger C creates a list to save the hash values for k messages, and sets
H = {((v1, · · · ,vk), (H(v1), · · · , H(vk)), e)}.
When adversaryA sends a set of messages (v1, · · · ,vk) to challenger C for hash values. C searches
listH.
If (v1, · · · ,vk) exist in listH, C returns (H(v1), · · · , H(vk)) directly.
If (v1, · · · ,vk) do not exist in list H, C samples e ←− DZm ,s, sets v = Ae mod q, and lets
v mod Λi = H(ωi), i = 1, · · · , k. Then C saves ((v1, · · · ,vk), (H(v1), · · · , H(vk)), e) in list H,
and returns (H(v1), · · · , H(vk)) to adversary A.
• Signing queries: In this stage, adversary A selects a set of messages (v1,v2, · · · ,vk), sends
the messages’ set to challenger C for the associated signature. Challenger C searches list H for
messages (v1,v2, · · · ,vk).
If the messages exist in listH, challenger C returns e directly.
If the messages do not exist in listH, Challenger C firstly executes Hash query, then returns e to
adversary A.
• Forgery: Once adversary A terminates signing queries, he offers a new message-signature pair
(v∗1 ,v
∗
2 , · · · ,v∗k , e∗).
Challenger C searches ((v∗1 ,v∗2 , · · · ,v∗k ), (H(v∗1 ), · · · , H(v∗k )), e′) in list H, then computes
e∗ − e′ as the solution to the SIS instance A.
Because message-signature pair (v∗1 ,v
∗
2 , · · · ,v∗k , e∗) is valid, adversary A has not made signing
query on (v∗1 , · · · ,v∗k ), and hash query on (v∗1 , · · · ,v∗k ) has been done. Given Ae′ = v mod q,
according to preimage min-entropy property of hash function [23], the min-entropy of e∗ is
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ω(log n), so that e′ − e∗ 6= 0 with overwhelming probability. Because e′ ←− DZm ,s, ‖e′‖ ≤ s
√
m.
‖e∗‖ ≤ s√m depends on the validity of forged signature. Therefore, ‖e′ − e∗‖ ≤ 2s√m.
6. Lattice-Based Batch Signature Based on FS Transformation
In lattice-based cryptography, trapdoor generation algorithm (Definition 2) and preimage
sampleable algorithm (Definition 3) are fundamental algorithms of signature scheme, but both
algorithms have high computational complexity. To improve signature scheme’s efficiency, we take
lattice signature based on Fiat–Shamir transformation in [26], apply to lattice-based batch signature
with intersection method, obtain a new and more efficient batch signature scheme.
6.1. Design
• Setup(n): In this stage, system parameters are provided with knowledge of security parameter n.
1. q may be 225, d may be 1, r may be 512.
2. m > 64+ n · log q/ log(2d + 1), κ satisfies 2κ ·
(
n
κ
)
≥ 2100.
3. s may be 12dκ
√
m, and M may be e(12dκ
√
m/s+(dκ
√
m/(2s))2).
4. H1 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Zn and H2 : {0, 1}∗ −→ {g : g ∈ {−1, 0, 1}r, ‖g‖1 ≤ κ} are collision
resistant hash functions, where ‖g‖1 is the 1-norm of vector g, namely, it is the sum of the
absolute values of each element of vector g.
• KeyGen(n): With system parameters as above, public verification key vk and secret signing key sk
are obtained in the following manners.
1. Select S← {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d}m×r randomly as secret signing key.
2. Select A← Zn×mq , compute T = AS as public verification key.
3. Compute k different lattices Λi, i = 1, · · · , k, such that Λ1 + Λ2 + · · · + Λk = Zn and
Λ1 ∩Λ2 ∩ · · · ∩Λk = Λ, which takes q as modulus.
Then vk = (A, T,Λ,Λi, i = 1, · · · , k), sk = S.
• Sign(sk, {v1, · · · ,vk} ∈ {{0, 1}∗}k): Given sk = S and the set of messages {v1, · · · ,vk} ∈
{{0, 1}∗}k, the following steps lead to batch signature on such messages.
1. Construct equations: 
v = H1(v1)modΛ1
v = H1(v2)modΛ2
· · ·
v = H1(vk)modΛk
compute its solution v.
2. Sample y← DZm ,s randomly, compute c = H2(Ay, v).
3. Let z = Sc + y, output (v, z, c) as signature with probability min( DZm ,s(z)MDZm ,s,Sc(z) , 1).
• Verify(vk,vj, (v, z, c)): For the j-th message vj and the signature (v, z, c), validation involves the
following three relations:
1. ‖z‖ ≤ 2s√m.
2. c = H2(Az− Tc, v).
3. vmodΛj = H1(vj).
If they are true, accept message vj; otherwise, reject it.
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6.2. Security Analysis
The batch signature scheme in Section 5 and the batch signature scheme in Section 6 are different
in terms of basic signature schemes: the first basic signature scheme comes from the literature [23],
the second basic signature scheme comes from the literature [26]. According to literature [30], for the
same security, the second bath signature scheme has better efficiency.
The same as batch signature scheme in Section 5, the batch signature scheme in Section 6’s
correctness and security can be reduced to its basic signature scheme, and the details are omitted here.
7. Efficiency Comparison and the Application to IoT
Refs. [14–16] are among the several most important batch signature schemes and improved
techniques so far. Ref. [14] first introduced the idea and provide the construction based on RSA scheme.
Later in [15], the authors focused on speeding up the modular exponentiation operation which is
used in many DLP based signatures. In other words, the work [15] focuses on signature schemes
which were built in the traditional multiplicative group, and then the authors in [16] managed to
achieve the constant complexity for signature generation and verification, which does not rely on
the number of messages. Our second and third schemes enjoy the same advantage as [16] regarding
constant generation and verification complexity. Comparing the concrete efficiency for those schemes
boils down to the issue of comparing the underlined algebraic primitives. According to [31], the key
parameters, namely n, q in our lattice based scheme should be chosen at around 500 and 200,000 to
achieve approximately the 128-bit level security. Generally speaking, our signature size will be larger
than the ones constructed in the group where DLP or ECDLP problem is hard. According to [32],
the computation of the lattice is very fast, and at the same security level the current lattice scheme will
outperform the RSA and DLP or ECDLP based schemes. Most importantly, up to now, none of the
previous listed batch signature schemes are able to resist against quantum attacks, which makes our
scheme a very attractive choice in a long run. Lattice primitives are also being optimized by taking
advantage of the modern CPU instruction such as AVX, AVX2 and so on [33], thus, the computation
speed can be expected to be further improved.
In our constructions, we make use of two different approaches to integrate a group of messages
to fulfill batch signatures, namely, binary tree and intersection methods. The schemes are existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks. Table 1 shows the efficiency of our scheme
regarding the different signature stages and parameter sizes in the asymptotic manner. From Table 1,
it can be seen that all of the schemes require O(n2log3n) complexity on the secret key generation,
while the 2nd and 3rd constructions only take O(n) for the size of signature, which means that a batch
signature is independent of the parameter k. For computational comparison, it can be seen that the 3rd
construction requires least computational complexity, O(n3), while others have to take S and other
operations. In the verification stage, the 2nd and 3rd scheme are constant cost instead of being linear
with k, unlike the 1st construction. In all aspects, 3rd construction is the most efficient, and we describe
its application in wireless body sensor network, which is a typical application of IoT.
Table 1. Efficiency comparison of our schemes.
Scheme Our 1st Scheme Our 2nd Scheme Our 3rd Scheme
(Size/Computation) (with Binary Tree) (With Intersection Method) (With FS Transformation)
sk O(n2log3n) O(n2log3n) O(n2log3n)
vk O(n2log2n) O(kn2) O(kn2)
signature O(kn) O(n) O(n)
Sign (2k− 1)H+ S +O(n2) O(n3) + S O(n3)
Veri f y 2V + kH 2V +H 3V+H
Anti-quantum
√ √ √
Notation: H denotes Hash function, S denotes SamplePre, V denotes verification.
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A wireless body sensor network [34] is composed of three sides: a receiver station(RS), many
central control units (CCU), and many sensors (SS). A receiver station manages multiple central control
units and a central control unit manages many sensors. Specifically, A patient’s body is implanted with
many sensors and a central control unit, which collects human medical data and sends it to the receiver
station. The receiver station is responsible for verifying data and warehousing for all central control
units, that is, the receiver station checks medical data and signs all of them. When a large number
of medical data, which is from different patients, come in at the same time, the receiver station will
become the bottleneck of data processing. Batch signature can solve the requirement of batch signing
and individual verification for patients’ medical data; the process is as follows.
Firstly, according to the 3rd batch signature scheme, wireless body sensor network sets up system
parameters and public/private keys for the receiver station. A central control unit collects medical
data in real time and sends it to the receiver station. The receiver station divides k central control unit
data into one group, such as {v1, · · · ,vk}, executes algorithm Sign(sk, {v1, · · · ,vk}), obtain (v, z, c),
store it with the message vi, i = 1, · · · , k. When the j-th central control unit’s data vj is called,
(vj, (v, z, c)) is provided, and the algorithm Verify(vj, (v, z, c)) can be invoked to verify the validity
of data vj. If the answer is yes, the data is authoritative and credible. Otherwise, the data is unusable.
The data flow diagram is shown in the Figure 3.
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ͻss
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  4.Verify(½j,(v,z,c))ĮYes or No
       j=1,Ċ,k
RS
Storage
½1
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Figure 3. Data Flow Diagram in Wireless Body Sensor Network.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented three new lattice-based batch signature schemes by using binary tree
and intersection methods, with hash-and-sign paradigm and Fiat–Shamir transformation, respectively.
Our schemes were existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks based on
the difficulty of a small integer solution problem, which provided quantum security. A detailed
efficiency analysis was also given, which showed that our schemes optimized the size of the public
key, private key and signature. Moreover, we applied our batch signature schemes to a wireless body
sensor network, which was a typical application of IoT, improved signature efficiency and security.
In addition, batch signatures can also be applied to blockchain systems for speeding up the process of
block signing operations, which we aim to be our next work.
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